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This paper presents a model in which in each of a succession of time periods the State and the private economy interact to determine rules under which the private agents will operate in the next period, and rules and resources that constrain interventions of the State in the next period. The set of State institutions, called regulators, that are the instruments of State intervention is endogenously determined in each period. The model is a multiperiod game consisting of two phases. The first is a (noncooperative) game played by private economic agents in each period, the rules for which are given by the regulators in the preceding period. The second phase is political. In each period the private agents acting politically determine the legal and budgetary constraints under which the regulators will operate in the next period, and thereby determine the noncooperative game to be played in the next period. Formal entities in the model allow a wide variety of regulatory instruments and transfer payments to be represented.

Michael Crew and David Parker have compiled a comprehensive, up-to-date and detailed analytical work on leading research issues in the economics of regulation. With contributions from international specialists in economic regulation, the Handbook provides a comprehensive discussion of major developments in both the theory and practice of regulatory economics. This book will be an indispensable source for both students and practitioners of regulation

This report was commissioned by Treasury in February 1999 as an input into its ongoing work programme on the regulation of network industries. Network industries are characterised by long-lived investments and increasing returns to scale. This raises two related concerns – protection of consumers from monopoly abuse and protection of investors from opportunistic behaviour by governments. This report reviews the underlying problems of economic regulation of network industries. In particular, it discusses the problems of monopoly and regulation, the objectives and principles of good regulation, the trade-offs that regulation must deal with, and international experience with network regulation in the UK, the US and Australia. Conclusions of the paper include that regulation should provide incentives for short and long-term efficiency, and that regulation should be based on the principles of openness, transparency, consistency and accountability.

Shaping markets through competition and economic regulation is at the heart of addressing the development challenges facing countries in southern Africa. The contributors to 'Competition Law And Economic Regulation: Addressing Market Power In Southern Africa' critically assess the efficacy of the competition and economic regulation frameworks, including the impact of a number of the regional competition authorities in a range of sectors throughout southern Africa. Featuring academics as well as practitioners in the field, the book addresses issues common to southern African countries, where markets are small and concentrated, with particularly high barriers to entry, and where the resources to enforce legislation against anti-competitive conduct are limited. What is needed, the contributors argue, is an understanding of competition and regional integration as part of an inclusive growth agenda for Africa. By examining competition and regulation in a single framework, and viewing this within the southern African experience, this volume adds new perspectives to the global competition literature. It is an essential reference tool and will be of great interest to policymakers and regulators, as well as the rapidly growing ecosystem of legal practitioners and economists engaged in the field.

Using case studies from the US, Canada, Germany and Switzerland as well as the European Union and the global economy, this is the first book of its kind to examine historical evidence on how competition among states - or the lack of it - affects regulation, especially labour market regulation